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STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
Is the evidence sufficient to support Defendant's conviction for retail theft? 
Standard of Review. The present appeal is from a criminal bench trial. 
Accordingly this Court reviews the District Court's factual determinations under a 
clearly erroneous standard. See State v. Galll 967 P.2d 930,933 (Utah 1988). 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
76-6-602. Retail theft, acts constituting. 
A person commits the offense of retail theft when he 
knowingly: 
(1) Takes possession of, conceals, carries away, transfers or 
causes to be carried away or transferred, any merchandise 
displayed, held, stored or offered for sale in a retail mercantile 
establishment with the intention of retaining such merchandise or 
with the intention of depriving the merchant permanently of the 
possession, use or benefit of such merchandise without paying the 
retail value of such merchandise; or 
(2) Alters, transfers, or removes any label, price tag, marking, 
indicia of value or any other markings which aid in determining 
value of any merchandise displayed, held, stored or offered for 
sale, in a retail mercantile establishment and attempts to 
purchase such merchandise personally or in consort with another 
at less than the retail value with the intention of depriving the 
merchant of the retail value of such merchandise; or 
(3) Transfers any merchandise displayed, held, stored or 
offered for sale in a retail mercantile establishment from the 
container in or on which such merchandise is displayed to any 
other container with the intention of depriving the merchant of 
the retail value of such merchandise; or 
(4) Under-rings with the intention of depriving the merchant of 
the retail value of the merchandise; or 
(5} Removes a shopping cart from the premises of a retail 
mercantile establishment with the intent of depriving the 
merchant of the possession, use or benefit of such cart. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
As more fully detailed in Argument 3 of the Argument section of this Brief, 
Defendant's Statement of the Case suggests facts and makes assumptions that are 
not in the record. 
Charge. Defendant was charged with one count of retail theft, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated §76-6-602. Appellant's Brief 
Addendum A. 
Conviction. Following a bench trial that lasted approximately one hour, 
Defendant was convicted as charged. R52. 
Sentence. A sentencing hearing was set for January 6, 2009 and a 
presentence investigation report was ordered. R54-55. At sentencing the trial court 
sentenced Defendant to 180 days in the Davis County Jail with 180 days suspended 
and was placed on supervised probation for eighteen months. Defendant was also 
ordered to pay a $350 fine, to pay restitution to Mervyn's in the amount of $124, to 
take a cognitive restructuring class and to obtain a GED or high school diploma 
before the end of Defendant's probation. Appellant's Brief Addendum C. 
Timely Appeal. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant's brief summarizes the evidence in the light most favorable to her 
case and not the verdict of the trial court. It is well established appellate practice 
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that this brief should recite the facts in the light most favorable to the verdict of the 
trial court. See State v. Finder, 2005 UT 15 f 2.114 P.3d 551. 
On March 14, 2008, Defendant and her mother visited the Mervyn's 
department store in the Layton Hills Mall, Layton Utah. R40. While in Mervyn's 
Defendant was observed viewing articles of clothing in a "High-Theft Storage Area" 
of the store. R8. Closed circuit cameras are placed throughout Mervyn's. R9. Loss 
Prevention Supervisor Anderson observed Defendant through the closed circuit 
cameras, and at times, in person. R9 and 12. The area of the store in which 
Defendant was observed is an area of focus for Mervyn's loss prevention officers 
because it is an area in which retail thefts occur frequently. R8. Loss Prevention 
Supervisor Anderson noted that Defendant was a high frequency retail theft area in 
the store and that Defendant displayed behaviors and mannerisms that shoplifters 
often display. R8-9. Notably, Defendant took items displayed for sale and draped 
them over her arm and ripped at least one tag from the clothing. R9-10. While 
doing this, she did a "look-around", or looked up at the ceiling. R8. Defendant then 
took the items she had draped over her arm, including the item she had removed the 
tag from, into the dressing room. Rll. Loss Prevention Supervisor Anderson exited 
the camera room and went into the dressing room where she observed Defendant 
and another person, her mother, within the same changing stall in the dressing 
room. R12-13. When Defendant exited the dressing room the items in her 
possession were not visible however, she appeared to be wearing more than one 
5 
shirt and her bag was larger than when she entered the dressing room. R14 and 16. 
Before Loss Prevention Supervisor Anderson could stop Defendant she was 
required, per Mervyn's policy, to check the dressing room. R29-31. When Loss 
Prevention Supervisor Anderson inspected the stall Defendant and her mother were 
in she found only one item of clothing, some pants. R16-18. In the pocket of the 
pants were numerous tags that had been removed from clothing that matched the 
clothing that was taken into the dressing room by Defendant. R16-18. Becaise Loss 
Prevention Supervisor Anderson was required to follow company policy and check 
the dressing room before stopping a shoplifter, Defendant was able to abruptly 
leave the store, enter her vehicle and leave. R17. By the time Loss Prevention 
Supervisor Anderson caught up to Defendant in the parking lot, Defendant had 
already got in her car and was driving away. Id. Loss Prevention Supervisor 
Anderson noted the make, model and license plate of the vehicle Defendant drove 
away in and relayed the information to the Layton Police Department. R17-18. 
After some investigation, Layton City Police were able to determine the identity of 
Defendant as Michelle Lee Spurgers. R36. Defendant was contacted by Layton 
Police and questioned regarding the theft at Mervyn's. R36-37. Defendant denied 
any involvement. R37. 
On April 16, 2008 the Defendant was charged by criminal information in the 
Second District Court, Layton Department with "Retail Theft", Utah Code §76-6-602. 
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Appellants Brief Addendum A. On October 16, 2008 a bench trial was conducted in 
which the Defendant was found guilty of violating §76-6-602 UCA. R52. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her 
conviction for retail theft should be rejected for a number of reasons. First, 
Defendant's brief is inadequate because she has not marshaled the evidence and has 
failed to present the facts in a light most favorable to the verdict. Second, the 
evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support a guilty verdict And finally, 
Defendant's brief asserts facts that are unsupported by the record. 
Argument 1 
THE DEFENDANT HAS NOT MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE AND HAS FAILED TO 
PRESENT THE FACTS IN A LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE VERDICT. 
Defendant's brief is inadequate because she has failed to marshal the 
evidence. To succeed on an insufficiency claim, Defendant must marshal all the 
evidence and demonstrate that it fails to establish the elements of retail theft. Utah 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 24 requires "A party challenging a fact finding must 
first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding." The 
marshaling process "serves the important function of reminding litigants and 
appellate courts of the broad deference owed to the fact finder at trial." State v. 
Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 739 (Utah App. 1990). Marshaling is an "arduous and 
painstaking" process. West Valley v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah 
App. 1991). 
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"To successfully appeal a trial court's findings of fact, appellate counsel 
must play the devil's advocate. 'Attorneys must extricate themselves 
from the client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's position. In 
order to properly discharge the marshalling duty..., the challenger must 
present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of 
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very 
findings the appellant resists.'" ONEIDA/SLIC, v. ONEIDA Cold Storage 
and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051,1052-53 (Utah App. 1994) 
(quoting West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah 
App. 1991)). 
In the instant case, Defendant claims to have met her burden of marshaling 
the evidence. Defendant's marshaling of the evidence simply consists of a list of 
witnesses called and the physical evidence admitted at trial. See Appellant's Brief 'Pg. 
11. It completely neglects to recite specific evidence presented at trial. Id. The 
following is Defendant's attempt to marshal the evidence: 
"The following is the marshaled evidence that supports the trial court's 
finding that Ms. Spurgers was guilty of retail theft: (1) The testimony of 
Teanna Anderson, Loss Prevention Supervisor for Mervyn's, 
concerning her observation of Ms. Spurgers during the incident in 
question; (See 10/16/08 Tr. Trans. 6-33; [sic] (2) The testimony of 
Layton City Police Officer Chad Jones, concerning his investigation of 
the case, including his telephone contact with Ms. Spurgers (See 
10/16/08 Tr. Trans. 34-39); (3) The testimony of Ms. Spurgers 
regarding the incident and her denial of taking anything (See 10/16/08 
Tr. Trans. 39-45); (4) The trial exhibits admitted at trial, which 
included a photo of similar items (See Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 -10/16/08 
Tr. Trans. 34-39), a photo of tags allegedly found from missing items 
(See Plaintiffs Exhibit 2 -10/16/08 Tr. Trans. 20-21); a bag of actual 
tags allegedly from missing items (See Plaintiffs Exhibit 3 -10/16/08 
Tr. Trans. 21-22); and (5) The store's video surveillance camera 
recording of the alleged incident (See Plaintiffs Exhibit 4 -10/16/08 
Tr. Trans. 1-22)" Id. 
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Again, marshaling is an arduous and painstaking process in which "the 
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of 
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the 
appellant resists." ONEIDA/SLIC, v. ONEIDA Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc., at 
1052-53. By simply listing those who testified at trial and listing the trial 
exhibits, Defendant has not undergone this "arduous and painstaking" process. See 
West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co. at 1315. 
Even if the Court were to consider Defendant's Statement of Facts in her Brief 
as her marshaling of the evidence it still inadequately recites the evidence 
submitted at trial, particularly the testimonial evidence. The trial court relied upon 
the testimony of all the witnesses in making reasonable inferences regarding 
Defendant's behavior on the date in question. It was this testimonial evidence upon 
which the trial court rendered a guilty verdict. For example, Defendant failed to 
marshal any of Loss Prevention Supervisor Anderson's testimony that while 
shopping, Defendant did a "look-around" R8. That Defendant ripped the tag off of at 
least one item of clothing. R5-6. That Mervyn's employees cleared the dressing 
room of all clothing and other items immediately prior to Defendant entering the 
dressing room. RIO. That Loss Prevention Supervisor Anderson viewed Defendant 
enter the dressing room with several items of clothing. Rll. That Loss Prevention 
Supervisor Anderson confirmed that Defendant was in the dressing room and that 
there was another person, her mother, in the dressing room stall with Defendant. 
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R12. That Defendant left dressing room with no items visibly her possession and 
she and her mother's bags were larger than when they entered the dressing room 
and that a second shirt was now visible under Defendant's shirt. R14 . That after 
Defendant left the dressing room Loss Prevention Supervisor Anderson checked the 
dressing room and confirmed that only one of the numerous items were left in the 
dressing room and the rest of the numerous items Defendant took into the dressing 
room could not be located. R16-17. That Defendant left the dressing room quickly 
and went straight for the door leading to the parking lot. Id. That Loss Prevention 
Supervisor Anderson wanted to stop Defendant but couldn't until she checked the 
dressing room per company policy. R32. And by the time she checked the dressing 
room Defendant was already entering her car in the parking lot and she was not 
able to stop Defendant for safety reasons and due to company policy. R32. 
Accompanied with and corroborating Loss Prevention Supervisor's testimony 
was a video confirming the events detailed in her testimony. See Plaintiffs Exhibit 4 
- 10/16/08 Tr. Trans. 19:1-22). It is also important to note that instead of reciting 
the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the trial court's verdict, 
Defendant argues the evidence in light most favorable to her acquittal. 
Instead of marshaling the evidence, Defendant merely lists the witnesses who 
testified at trial and the exhibits admitted at trial. This is not marshaling the 
evidence. 
Argument 2 
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THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR 
RETAIL THEFT. 
Notwithstanding Defendant's failure to marshal the evidence, the evidence 
presented at trial was more than sufficient to support a guilty verdict. As noted by 
the Trial Court, there was no issue regarding identity, date, or location in the instant 
case. R52. The only question in the present case is whether Defendant took 
possession of, concealed or carried away or caused to be carried away or 
transferred some merchandise for Mervyn's, the value of which was less than $300 
was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court correctly found beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Defendant "did in fact take possession of, conceal, carry away 
or cause to be carried away or transferred some merchandise from Mervyn's, at 
least one item. And that value is less than $300." Id. In considering a sufficiency of 
the evidence claim, this Court's inquiry is limited. See State v. Boss, 127 P.3d 1236. 
(Utah App. 2005). "So long as there is some evidence, including reasonable 
inferences, from which findings of all the requisite elements of the crime can 
reasonably be made, our inquiry stops." Id. at 1238 (quoting State v. Mead, 27 P.3d 
1115). 
The trial court considered the following evidence at trial. The testimony of 
Loss Prevention Supervisor Anderson, the testimony of Layton Police Detective 
Chad Jones, the testimony of Defendant, the surveillance video, some photos of tags 
and clothing similar to the clothing taken, and the actual tags found in the dressing 
room. 
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The uncontroverted evidence demonstrates that the trial courts findings were 
not clearly erroneous and that the inferences made were reasonable. Defendant 
removed clothing from the display shelves and removed hangers from the clothing. 
R8-16. Defendant did a "look-around". R8. Defendant removed a tag from at least 
one item of clothing which is corroborated by the surveillance video and was 
admitted by Defendant. R41, Plaintiffs Exhibit 4. Defendant entered the dressing 
room with a substantial amount of clothing. Rll. Defendant was observed with 
another person, her mother, inside a dressing room stall. R12-13. When Defendant 
left the dressing room her bag was larger than when Defendant entered. R13-14 
and 16. When Loss Prevention Supervisor Anderson checked the dressing room 
stall only one item of clothing was left in the stall and there were numerous tags left 
behind that had been removed from the unaccounted for clothing items that 
Defendant brought into the dressing room. R17-18. Defendant left the dressing 
room with an additional shirt now protruding from the bottom of her shirt. R18. 
Defendant admitted to having an additional "second" shirt on underneath her shirt 
but claimed she wore it the whole time. R44. When Defendant left the dressing 
room she immediately left the store, walked straight to her vehicle and drove away. 
R17. 
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, it is clear that 
the trial court's inferences were reasonable. As detailed in State v. Boss, there is 
"some evidence" upon which inferences were reasonably made and the evidence is 
12 
not "completely lacking or. . . so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict 
plainly unreasonable and unjust." State v. Heaps, 2000 UT 5, P 19, 999 P.2d 565, See 
also State v. Boss. The trial court correctly found Defendant guilty of retail theft. 
Argument 3 
DEFENDANTS BRIEF CONTAINS ASSERTIONS THAT ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY 
THE RECORD. 
In considering Defendant's defects in marshaling the evidence and presenting 
facts in a light most favorable to the verdict, it is important to note that Defendant 
also makes assertions regarding Loss Prevention Supervisor Anderson's testimony 
and actions that are unsupported by the record. Defendant attempts to make 
inferences that are clearly lacking and even contradicted in the record. For example, 
in her brief, Defendant attempts to argue that the Loss Prevention Supervisor 
Anderson was "unsure" of the theft and "refused" to detain Defendant. Appellant's 
Brief Pg. 13. This is untrue and unsupported by the record. In her testimony Loss 
Prevention Supervisor Anderson testified that she wanted to stop them but she had 
to follow company policy before doing so. R17. This resulted in the loss of value 
time to stop Defendant before she exited the store. Id. She stated, "I wanted to stop 
them and ask them about the merchandise, if I could get it back." Id. She further 
testified that she followed Defendant into the parking lot but couldn't stop her 
because, "they weren't still walking. As I looked over they were getting in a car, and 
so I got the license plate of the car." Id. Defendant further attempts to argue that 
Loss Prevention Supervisor Anderson had several opportunities to stop Defendant. 
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Appellant's Brief Pg. 13. At trial the loss prevention officer Anderson was asked if 
there was a reason she did not immediately stop Defendant R31. Loss Prevention 
Supervisor Anderson replied that she could not because she had to follow Mervyn's 
policy before making a stop. Id. She responded, "Yes, there is. My company policy 
states that I need to verify all of my steps. We had to have certain criteria and 
certain steps before we go out on a stop, and one of them is checking the fitting 
room." Id. 
Another example of arguments asserted as facts not supported in the record 
is Defendant's Statement of the Case and Statement of Facts which suggest that Loss 
Prevention Supervisor Anderson "allowed" Defendant to leave and that "Ms. 
Spurgers and her mother were allowed to leave the premises without being detained 
in any manner by the merchant". Appellant's Brief Pgs. 2 and 4 (emphasis added). 
The loss prevention officer clearly intended to stop Defendant but never had the 
opportunity as Defendant left the store quickly and went directly to her vehicle. 
R32. 
In Defendant's Summary of the Arguments she again alleges that Loss 
Prevention Supervisor Anderson "refused" to detain Defendant despite having 
"several opportunities". Appellants Brief Pg. 7. And again this is contrary to the 
testimony of Loss Prevention Supervisor Anderson who clearly stated she was 
simply following company policy by checking the dressing room before stopping 
Defendant. R17. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons more fully set forth above, Plaintiff and Appellee respectfully 
requests that this Court affirm the conviction of Defendant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINTON R. DRAKE (11155) 
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE 
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